[Ed. Note: This text has been OCR scanned from the original PDF of the Senate Report, more of which we may publish from time to time. We’ve tried to catch any typographical errors that this may have introduced, but may have missed some. If you see any, please let us know.]
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program
Foreword by Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: Chairman Dianne Feinstein
Findings and Conclusions
Executive Summary
Approved December 13, 2012
Updated for Release April 3, 2014
Declassification Revisions, December 3, 2014
Foreword
On April 3, 2014, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence voted to send the
Findings and Conclusions and the Executive Summary of its final Study on the
CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program to the President for declassification
and subsequent public release.
This action marked the culmination of a monumental effort that officially began
with the Committee’s decision to initiate the Study in March 2009, but which had
its roots in an investigation into the CIA’s destruction of videotapes of CIA
detainee interrogations that began in December 2007.
‘The full Committee Study, which totals more than 6,700 pages, remains classified
but is now an official Senate report. The full report has been provided to the White
House, the CIA, the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, the
Department of State, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in the
hopes that it will prevent future coercive interrogation practices and inform the
management of other covert action programs.
As the Chairman of the Committee since 2009, I write to offer some additional
views, context, and history.
I began my service on the Senate Intelligence Committee in January 2001. I
remember testimony that summer from George Tenet, the Director of Central
Intelligence, that warned of a possible major terrorist event against the United
States, but without specifics on the time, location, or method of attack. On
September 11, 2001, the world learned the answers to those questions that had
consumed the CIA and other parts of the U.S. Intelligence Community.}
I recall vividly watching the horror of that day, to include the television footage of
innocent men and women jumping out of the World Trade Center towers to escape
the fire. The images, and the sounds as their bodies hit the pavement far below,
will remain with me for the rest of my life.
It is against that backdrop – the largest attack against the American homeland in
our history – that the events desc~bed in this report were undertaken.
[Note 1: For information on the events at the CIA prior to September 11,
2001, see the Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
upon the United States (9/11 Commission) and Office of the Inspector
General Report on CIA Accountability With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks.]
Nearly 13 years later, the Executive Summary and Findings and Conclusions of
this report are being released. They are highly critical of the CIA’s actions, and
rightfully so. Reading them, it is easy to forget the context in which the program
began – not that the context should serve as an excuse, but rather as a warning for
the future.
It is worth remembering the pervasive fear in late 2001 and hoW immediate the
threat felt. Just a week after the September 11 attacks, powdered anthrax was sent
to various news organizations and to two U.S. Senators. The American public was
shocked by news of new terrorist plots and elevations of the color-coded threat
level of the Homeland Security Advisory System. We expected further attacks
against the nation.
I have attempted throughout to remember the impact on the nation and to the CIA
workforce from the attacks of September 11, 2001. I can understand the CIA’s
impulse to consider the use of every possible tool to gather intelligence and remove
terrorists from the battlefield,2 and CIA was encouraged by political leaders and
the public to do whatever. it could to prevent another attack.
The Intelligence Committee as well often pushes intelligence agencies to act
quickly in response to threats and world events.
Nevertheless, such pressure, fear, and expectation of further terrorist plots do not
justify, temper, or excuse improper actions taken by individuals or organizations in
the name of national security. The major lesson of this report is that regardless of
the pressures and the need to act, the Intelligence Community’s actions must
always reflect who we are as a nation, and adhere to our laws and standards. It is
precisely at these times of national crisis that our government must be guided by
the lessons of our history and subject decisions to internal and external review.
Instead, CIA personnel, aided by two outside contractors, decided to initiate a
program of indefinite secret detention and the use of brutal interrogation
techniques in violation of U.S. law, treaty obligations, and our values.
This Committee Study documents the abuses and countless mistakes made
between late 2001 and early 2009. The Executive Summary of the Study provides
[Note 2: It is worth repeating that the covert action authorities approved
by the President in September 2001 did not provide any authorization
or contemplate coercive interrogations.]
a significant amount of new information, based on CIA and other documents, to
what has already been made public by the Bush and Obama Administrations, as
well as non-governmental organizations and the press.
The Committee’s full Study is more than ten times the length of the Executive
Summary and includes comprehensive and excruciating detail. The Study
describes the history of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program from its
inception to its termination, including a review of each of the 119 known
individuals who were held in CIA custody.
The full Committee Study also provides substantially more detail than what is
included in the Executive Summary on the CIA’s justification and defense of its
interrogation program on the basis that it was necessary and critical to the
disruption of specific terrorist plots and the capture of specific terrorists. While the
Executive Summary provides sufficient detail to demonstrate the inaccuracies of
each of these claims, the information in the full Committee Study is far more
extensive.
I chose not to seek declassification of the full Committee Study at this time. I
believe that the Executive Summary includes enough information to adequately
describe the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, and the Committee’s
Findings and Conclusions cover the entirety of the program. Seeking
declassification of the more than six thousand page report would have significantly
delayed the release of the Executive Summary. Decisions will be made later on the
declassification and release of the full 6,700 page Study.
In 2009, when this effort began, I stated (in a press release co-authored with the
Vice Chairman of the Committee, Senator Kit Bond) that “the purpose is to review
the program and to shape detention and interrogation policies in the future.” The
review is now done. It is my sincere and deep hope that through the release of
these Findings and Conclusions and Executive Summary that U.S. policy will
never again allow for secret indefinite detention and the use of coercive
interrogations. As the Study describes, prior to the attacks of September 2001, the
CIA itself determined from its own experience with coercive interrogations, that
such techniques “do not produce intelligence,” “will probably result in false
answers,” and had historically proven to be ineffective. Yet these conclusions
were ignored. We cannot again allow history to be forgotten and grievous past
mistakes to be repeated.
President Obama signed Executive Order 13491 in January 2009 to prohibit the
CIA from holding detainees other than on a “short-term, transitory basis” and to
limit interrogation techniques to those included in the Army Field Manual.
However, these limitations are not part of U.S. law and could be overturned by a
future president with the stroke of a pen. They should be enshrined in legislation.
Even so, existing U.S. law and treaty obligations should have prevented many of
the abuses and mistakes made during this program. While the Office of Legal
Counsel found otherwise between 2002 and 2007, it is my personal conclusion
that, under any common meaning of the term, CIA detainees were tortured. I also
believe that the conditions of confinement and the use of authorized and
unauthorized interrogation and conditioning techniques were cruel, inhuman, and
degrading. I believe the evidence of this is overwhelming and incontrovertible.
While the Committee did not make specific recommendations, several emerge
from the Committee’s review. The CIA, in its June 2013 response to the
Committee’s Study from December 2012, has also already made and begun to
implement its own recommendations. I intend to work with Senate colleagues to
produce recommendations and to solicit views from the readers of the Committee
Study.
I would also like to take this opportunity to describe the process of this study.
As noted previously, the Committee approved the Terms of Reference for the
Study in March 2009 and began requesting information from the CIA and other
federal departments. The Committee, through its staff, had already reviewed in
2008 thousands of CIA cables describing the interrogations of the CIA detainees
Abu Zubaydah and ‘Abd ai-Rahim al-Nashiri, whose interrogations were the
subject of videotapes that were destroyed by the CIA in 2005.
The 2008 review was complicated by the existence of a Department of Justice
investigation, opened by Attorney General Michael Mukasey, into the destruction
of the videotapes and expanded by Attorney General Holder in August 2009. In
particular, CIA employees and contractors who would otherwise have been
interviewed by the Committee staff were under potential legal jeopardy, and
therefore the CIA would not compel its workforce to appear before the Committee.
This constraint lasted until the’Committee’s research and documentary review
were completed and the Committee Study had largely been finalized.
Furthermore, given the volume and internal nature of relevant CIA documents, the
CIA insisted that the Committee enter into an arrangement where our staff would
review documents and conduct research at a CIA-leased facility rather than at the
Committee’s offices on Capitol Hill.
From early 2009 to late 2012, a small group of Committee staff reviewed the more
than. six million pages of CIA materials, to include operational cables, intelligence
reports, internal memoranda and emails.briefing materials, interview transcripts,
contracts, and other records. Draft sections of the Study were prepared and
distributed to the full Committee membership beginning in October 2011 and this
process continued through to the Committee’s vote to approve the full Committee
Study on December 13, 2012.
The breadth of documentary material on which the Study relied and which the
Committee Study cites is unprecedented. While the Committee did not interview
CIA officials in the context of the Committee Study, it had access to and drew
from the interviews of numerous CIA officials conducted by the CIA’s Inspector
General and the CIA Oral History program on subjects that lie at the heart of the
Committee Study, as well as past testimony to the Committee.
Following the December 2012 vote, the Committee Study was sent to the President
and appropriate parts of the Executive Branch for comments by February 15, 2013.
The CIA responded in late June 2013 with extensive comments on the Findings
and Conclusions, based in part on the responses of CIA officials involved in the
program. At my direction, the Committee staff met with CIA representatives in
order to fully understand the CIA’s comments, and then incorporated suggested
edits or comments as appropriate.
The Committee Study, including the now-declassified Executive Summary and
Findings and Conclusions, as updated is now final and represents the official views
of the Committee. This and future Administrations should use this Study to guide
future programs, correct past mistakes, increase oversight of CIA representations
to policymakers, and ensure coercive interrogation practices are not used by our
government again.
Finally, I want to recognize the members of the staff who have endured years of
long hours poring through the difficult details of one of the lowest points in our
nation’s history. They have produced the most significant and comprehensive
oversight report in the Committee’s history, and perhaps in that of the U.S. Senate,
and their contributions should be recognized and praised.
Daniel Jones has managed and led the Committee’s review effort from its
inception. Dan has devoted more than six years to this effort, has personally
written thousands of its pages, and has been integrally involved in every Study
decision. Evan Gottesman, Chad Tanner, and Alissa Starzak have also played
integral roles in the Committee Study and have spent considerable years
researching and drafting specific sections of the Committee Study.
Other Committee staff members have also assisted in the review and provided
valuable contributions at the direction of our Committee Members. They include,
among others, Jennifer Barrett, Nick Basciano, Michael Buchwald, Jim Catella,
Eric Chapman, John Dickas, Lorenzo Goco, Andrew Grotto, Tressa Guenov, Clete
Johnson, Michael Noblet, Michael Pevzner, Tommy Ross, Caroline Tess, and
James Wolfe. The Committee’s Staff Director throughout the review, David
Grannis, has played a central role in assisting me and guiding the Committee
through this entire process. Without the expertise, patience, and work ethic of our
able staff, our Members would not have been able to complete this most important
work.
Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Some of the most shocking findings, per the link below:
“Bush was not briefed during the first four years of the program, but Vice President Dick Cheney was.
A CIA email from 2003 said “the White House is extremely concerned [Secretary of State Colin] Powell would blow his stack if he were to be briefed” about the details of the program.
The report says the CIA paid two psychologists more than $80 million to come up with torture methods. In the report’s executive summary, the programs developed by the CIA and these two contractors are described as “brutal” and “in violation of U.S. law, treaty obligations, and our values.”
Additionally, the report found the agency paid millions of dollars, in cash, to foreign governments to get them to host “black sites” where interrogations were held (two of which were not used because of political concerns about the host countries). The report says one country paid by the CIA torture program was told that the black site was serving a different purpose entirely.
Torture programs described in the report include “rectal feeding,” sleep deprivation, insects, use of diapers, and mock executions. According to the report, “rectal hydration” was used as a means of “behavior control.”
The CIA accidentally tortured two of its informants.
CIA forced detainees to wear diapers “to cause humiliation” and “induce a sense of helplessness.” Learned helplessness is used to coerce the prisoner’s cooperation in terms of confessions, many of which later turn out to be false.
The report repeatedly questions the quality of the information obtained through enhanced interrogation techniques. It found at least 26 people were wrongly detained as part of the program. One detainee was recommended for release because he was given to the CIA under false pretenses. Instead, the CIA transferred the detainee to US custody for another four years. The report noted detainees who were tortured “provided fabricated information on critical intelligence issues.”
According to the report, CIA officials, including the agency’s former director, Michael Hayden, repeatedly lied about details of the program. The report describes instances of the CIA misleading the Department of Justice, a US Senate committee, and the media about the usage and effectiveness of enhanced interrogation techniques. It says that the CIA attempted to manipulate press coverage of the program. Hayden did not immediately respond to a request for comment from Business Insider about the report.”
Read more: http://www.businessinsider.com/the-senate-is-about-to-release-the-cia-torture-report-2014-12#ixzz3LpLYXpSF
*Torture is a relative term. If you watch the Wind and the Lion with Shawn Connery and Candice Bergen you would have a better perspective on what torture or traitorism is based upon Islamic Law. Beheading someone has been standard practice in Arab lands since the birth of Mohammed and probably before. It is a cultural thing. Once you break your word in Islam, it becomes a lot like Mafia Justice, only quicker. Beheading is the typical quick fix for anyone that is either an enemy or someone that has betrayed the will of Allah. It is terribly offensive to the western cilvilizations,…but then Electrocuting, hangin g and lethal injection are plenty offensive to Arabic nations. Shocking eh?
What about Yves Montand in State of Siege?…it is a prelude to the Detention and Interrogation Program…
*The Spanish Inquisition was the prelude, before that it was simple annilation by raiding hordes from various groups of terrorists which include Gengis Khan. Our modern day Rendition concept is really no different that putting up the Gitmo Concept only in paid off countries that have nice torture cellers and Chambers for rent. We bring to your attention the horrible atroscities of the Maw Maw uprisings in Africa – Disembowled Pregnant Women were typical and worse. The evil in man is apparently endless. It has been going on for thousands of years. We bring to your attention to our captured troops during the Korean War. They would roll up in a corner and die of what they called: “Give up Itus!” The reasons were clear, poor nutrition, poor hygene and worse than that was the mental torture of telling our soldiers over and over and over again: “You are stupid, you are baby killers, you are from the worst society of earth because of your bigotry and hate for your fellow man! You are going to war for Fat Cats on Wall Street” Guess these guys didn’t have stronger parents that had been telling that same stuff for years….before they went into the Armed Services. Instead, the parents just said: “No one said it was going to be easy!” “No one gets a promise of success in life!” “When we were your age…..we had it alot worse!” “You’re not going to be liked by everyone…..you know”
Uh…
“– the largest attack against the American homeland in our history –”
Is she familiar with the War of 1812, or Lee’s two different marches north?
Yeah, picky, picky.
I hate the word “homeland.”